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By ROBERT D. KAPLAN
Published: October 6, 2009

IN Afghanistan’s Logar Province, just south of Kabul, the geopolitical future of Asia is becoming apparent: American troops are providing security for a Chinese state-owned company to exploit the Aynak copper reserves, which are worth tens of billions of dollars. While some of America’s NATO allies want to do as little as possible in the effort to stabilize Afghanistan, China has its eyes on some of world’s last untapped deposits of copper, iron, gold, uranium and precious gems, and is willing to take big risks in one of the most violent countries to secure them.

In Afghanistan, American and Chinese interests converge. By exploiting Afghanistan’s metal and mineral reserves, China can provide thousands of Afghans with jobs, thus generating tax revenues to help stabilize a tottering Kabul government. Just as America has a vision of a modestly stable Afghanistan that will no longer be a haven for extremists, China has a vision of Afghanistan as a secure conduit for roads and energy pipelines that will bring natural resources from the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. So if America defeats Al Qaeda and the irreconcilable elements of the Taliban, China’s geopolitical position will be enhanced.

This is not a paradox, since China need not be our future adversary. Indeed, combining forces with China in Afghanistan might even improve the relationship between Washington and Beijing. The problem is that while America is sacrificing its blood and treasure, the Chinese will reap the benefits. The whole direction of America’s military and diplomatic effort is toward an exit strategy, whereas the Chinese hope to stay and profit.

But what if America decides to leave, or to drastically reduce its footprint to a counterterrorism strategy focused mainly on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border? Then another scenario might play out. Kandahar and other areas will most likely fall to the Taliban, creating a truly lawless realm that wrecks China’s plans for an energy and commodities passageway through South Asia. It would also, of course, be a momentous moral victory achieved by radical Muslims who, having first defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, will then have triumphed over another superpower.

And the calculations get more complicated still: a withdrawal of any kind from Afghanistan before a stable government is in place would also hurt India, a critical if undeclared American ally, and increasingly a rival of China. Were the Taliban to retake Afghanistan, India would face a radical Islamistan stretching from its border with Pakistan deep into Central Asia. With the Taliban triumphant on Pakistan’s western border, jihadists there could direct their energies to the eastern border with India.

India would defeat Pakistan in a war, conventional or nuclear. But having to do so, or simply needing to face down a significantly greater jihadist threat next door, would divert India’s national energies away from further developing its economy and its navy, a development China would quietly welcome.

Bottom line: China will find a way to benefit no matter what the United States does in Afghanistan. But it probably benefits more if we stay and add troops to the fight. The same goes for Russia. Because of continuing unrest in the Islamic southern tier of the former Soviet Union, Moscow has an interest in America stabilizing Afghanistan (though it would take a certain psychological pleasure from a humiliating American withdrawal).

In nuts-and-bolts terms, if we stay in Afghanistan and eventually succeed, other countries will benefit more than we will. China, India and Russia are all Asian powers, geographically proximate to Afghanistan and better able, therefore, to garner practical advantages from any stability our armed forces would make possible.

Everyone keeps saying that America is not an empire, but our military finds itself in the sort of situation that was mighty familiar to empires like that of ancient Rome and 19th-century Britain: struggling in a far-off corner of the world to exact revenge, to put down the fires of rebellion, and to restore civilized order. Meanwhile, other rising and resurgent powers wait patiently in the wings, free-riding on the public good we offer. This is exactly how an empire declines, by allowing others to take advantage of its own exertions.

Of course, one could make an excellent case that an ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan is precisely what would lead to our decline, by demoralizing our military, signaling to our friends worldwide that we cannot be counted on and demonstrating that our enemies have greater resolve than we do. That is why we have no choice in Afghanistan but to add troops and continue to fight.

But as much as we hone our counterinsurgency skills and develop assets for the “long war,” history would suggest that over time we can more easily preserve our standing in the world by using naval and air power from a distance when intervening abroad. Afghanistan should be the very last place where we are a land-based meddler, caught up in internal Islamic conflict, helping the strategic ambitions of the Chinese and others.

Robert D. Kaplan is a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a correspondent for The Atlantic.

Courtesy: New York Times

US forces have withdrawn from a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan following last week’s major battle there with the Taliban, NATO-led forces said today in Kabul.

The pullout was announced before the October 3 attack, but the assault has drawn fresh attention to a new US strategy to move troops out of remote areas and focus more on populated districts.

“It is the intent of the ISAF (NATO-led force) commander, US Army General Stanley McChrystal, to place an emphasis on protecting the people of Afghanistan by focusing on more populated areas,” the NATO-led force said in a statement.

It said troops and equipment had been moved from the outpost in the Kamdesh district of northeastern Nuristan Province to other locations in eastern Afghanistan.

In the deadliest attack for US forces since a July 2008 battle in nearby Kunar, eight US soldiers were killed when Taliban fighters stormed remote outposts near the Pakistan border last week. At least two Afghan troops died in the firefight.

NATO forces said 100 insurgents were killed.

In the past, when US troops have left areas in dispute, the Taliban have launched attacks to display strength and lay claim to them.

This year has become by far the deadliest for Western forces in the eight-year war that followed the removal of the Taliban from power. More than 400 Western troops have died so far, more than in the entire period from 2001-05.

There are now more than 100,000 Western forces serving in Afghanistan, two-thirds of them American. McChrystal has submitted a request for tens of thousands more, arguing that without them he cannot implement his new strategy and the war will probably be lost


By Shaheen Sehbai

ISLAMABAD: Intense search has begun in political and media circles to find out who is the father of the Pakistan Army and ISI-specific conditions in the Kerry-Lugar Bill, which ultimately led to the assertive statement issued by the 122nd corps commanders’ meeting on Wednesday. But the search will not be too difficult.

All fingers point to the Pakistani lobbyists in Washington who were hired by the Pakistan Embassy after thePPP government came into power in 2008. These lobbyists, including Mark A Siegel and Cassidy and Associates, were supposed to work for Pakistan and were paid million of dollars, but they were actually lobbying against Pakistan and were trying to get anti-Pakistan conditions inserted in the Kerry-Lugar Bill.

Experts, who know Washington, say the lobbyists do only what their client tells them. In the case of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the client has been the Pakistan Embassy, so the buck will have to stop at the Pakistani mission in Washington DC.

But according to one expert, the details of all these Army-specific conditions were spelled out in a well-publicised book published by a Pakistani scholar-cum-journalist-cum-diplomat, way back in January 2006.

The language in which the scholar, Husain Haqqani, now Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington and the main proponent of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, had urged Washington to put these conditions on Pakistan would shock everyone, when read in today’s context.

For instance, the book ëPakistan between Mosque and Militaryí states categorically that “the United States must use its aid as a lever to influence Pakistan’s domestic policies.” The book states: “Washington should no longer condone the Pakistani military’s support of Islamic militants, its use of its intelligence apparatus for controlling domestic politics, and its refusal to cede power to a constitutional democratic government.”

At another place the book says: “Because Washington has attached a few conditions to US aid, the spending patterns of Pakistan’s government have not changed significantly. The country’s military spending continues to increase…”

On pages 327 to 329, Haqqani says: “Unlike governments in other Muslim countries like Egypt and Turkey, Pakistan’s government – particularly its military – has encouraged political and radical Islam, which otherwise has a relatively narrow base of support. Democratic consensus on limiting or reversing Islamisation would gradually roll back the Islamist influence in Pakistani public life. Islamists would maintain their role as a minority pressure group representing a particular point of view, but they would stop wielding their current disproportionate influence over the country’s overall direction.

“The United States can help contain the Islamists’ influence by demanding reform of those aspects of Pakistan’s governance that involve the military and security services. Until now, the United States has harshly berated corrupt or ineffective Pakistani politicians but has only mildly criticised the military’s meddling. Between 1988 and 1999, when civilians ostensibly governed Pakistan, US officials routinely criticised the civilians’ conduct but refrained from commenting on the negative role of the military and the intelligence services despite overwhelming evidence of that role. ISI manipulation of the 1988, 1990, and 1997 elections went unnoticed publicly by the United States while the Pakistan military’s recitation of politicians’ failings was generally accepted without acknowledging the impacts of limits set for the politicians by the military. The United States appears to accept the Pakistani military’s falsified narrative of Pakistan’s recent history, at least in public. It is often assumed that the military’s intervention in politics is motivated by its own concern over national security and the incompetence of politicians. That the military might be a contributor to political incompetence and its desire to control national security policies might be a function of its pursuit of domestic political power are hardly ever taken into account.

“Washington should no longer condone the Pakistani military’s support of Islamic militants, its use of its intelligence apparatus for controlling domestic politics, and its refusal to cede power to a constitutional democratic government. As an aid donor, Washington has become one of Pakistan’s most important benefactors, but a large part of US economic assistance since September 11, 2001 has been used to pay down Pakistan’s foreign debt. Because Washington has attached a few conditions to US aid, the spending patterns of Pakistan’s government have not changed significantly. The country’s military spending continues to increase, and spending for social services is well below the level required to improve living conditions for ordinary Pakistanis. The United States must use its aid as a lever to influence Pakistan’s domestic policies. Even though Musharraf’s selective cooperation in hunting down Al-Qaeda terrorists is a positive development, Washington must not ignore Pakistan’s state sponsorship of Islamist militants, its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles at the expense of education and healthcare, and its refusal to democratise; each of these issues is directly linked to the future of Islamic radicalism.

“The United States clearly has a few good short-term policy options in relation to Pakistan. American policymakers should endeavour to recognise the failings of their past policies and avoid repeating their mistakes. The United State has sought short-term gains from its relationship with Pakistan, inadvertently accentuating that country’s problems in the process. Pakistan’s civil and military elite, on the other hand, must understand how their three-part paradigm for state and nation building has led Pakistan from one disaster to the next. Pakistan was created in a hurry and without giving detailed thought to various aspects of national and state building. Perhaps it is time to rectify that mistake by taking a long-term view. Both Pakistan’s elite and their US benefactors would have to participate in transforming Pakistan into a functional, rather than ideological, state.”

Once these considered suggestions and proposals made by the current Pakistan ambassador are analysed in today’s context, there will be few left who would continue to search for the source of the insulting conditions which the Kerry-Lugar Bill has imposed on Pakistan.

Courtesy: The News

The Naxalite Threat

LONDON – Far removed from the photo-shopped images of ‘Shining India’, lies a dark and sinister shadow that stalks the Indian Republic. The spectre of the Naxalite threat now has middle-class urban Indians nervous as they watch increasingly worrisome media reports of the repeated failures of Indian Security Forces in containing the ‘red menace’ in the jungles and hinterlands of India.

What was once only a peripheral threat to the Indian State has now reached a critical mass that has left even the ivory-tower Indian elites in New Delhi with furrowed brows. An embarrassing problem once ignored and neglected has now broken out into the worlds glare. And rightly so. As the vigour of the Reds grows from strength to strength, and the impotence of the Indian Army and Paramilitary is increasingly apparent, questions are being raised of the safety and security of India’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Similar concerns were raised internationally only a few months ago when the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan were said to be within spitting distance of Islamabad and Pakistan’s own nuclear arsenal was seen as an obvious target. But whereas the Pakistan Army swiftly and efficiently routed the militants from a standing start within just a few weeks, their colleagues in India have struggled to contain an irresistibly growing Naxalite movement that has pledged to bring New Delhi down.

In fact, there are few parallels that can be drawn with the Pakistani case. Whereas the Pakistani militants numbers in a few thousand and were confined to a tiny fraction in the north of the country, their Indian equivalents boast ranks of at least 20,000 strong (and growing) and have had significantly greater success. Now infesting massive swathes of Indian territory, India’s Naxalite problem is the most prolific and violent insurgency in any nuclear armed nation, and leaves Pakistan’s recent troubles far behind in terms of the implications for regional and indeed international security.

According to Indian government sources, the insurgency, which started in 1967 as a peasant uprising, has now spread to 20 of India’s 28 states – and is showing no signs of exhaustion. A staggering 700 people, including civilians and police, have been killed in the rebellion so far this year, up from 638 in total last year. Observers may be shocked that such dangerous developments have been scarce reported in the world’s media, but in September the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh – probably on a break from being feted in world capitals – let the cat out of the bag when he described Naxalism as India’s greatest security threat, and said that security forces were failing to halt it.

With the rebel movement seemingly unstoppable, the international community is becoming increasingly vocal in its concerns of the very dangerous prospect of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of fanatical extremists. A the same time, the Indian government is desperate to save face and avoid derailing its recent global public relations blitz. Thus it is planning a major assault on the rebels across the four states where their presence is strongest. The move comes as new evidence emerges the Naxalites are stepping up their military and operational deployments as their successes have won them thousands of new recruits across the country.

But commentators are sceptical about what this new campaign can possibly achieve considering all of India’s recent botched attempts to stamp out the growing menace. Ajay Sahni, executive director of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, says Indian forces do not have the strength – in terms of “numbers, training, transportation, arms” – to gain control over such vast swaths of territory. “Until there’s been a steady, tremendous capacity-building, all deployments will be irrational,” he says. “It will just be a nibbling away at the peripheries, and a lot of security forces will be killed.”

As Indian forces are sent into the rebel-infested eastern states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Bihar, the world will watch with baited breath. It is too early to say whether international concerns over the security of the Indian state and nuclear arsenal will be alleviated, but considering past performance, the prospect does not look good. The Indian Army may buck past trends and achieve its objectives, but more likely, there will be a great deal of movement in international capitals as contingencies are drawn for the worst-case-scenario.

Atif F Qureshi  PKKH Editorial Team and www.PakDestiny.net

Source: Agencies | 2009-10-8 |

US President Barack Obama has received a request for more troops by the top US commander in Afghanistan, the Pentagon said yesterday, moving him a step closer to a long-awaited decision on a new military buildup.

The document recommends sending up to 40,000 additional US and NATO troops to support the stalled, eight-year-old Afghan campaign on top of the 104,000 currently in place, according to congressional officials.

Obama, who has launched a review of his administration’s six-month-old war strategy, remains undecided on whether to send in more troops — the recommendation of the top US and NATO commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, to try to reverse gains by a resurgent Taliban, officials said.

White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Obama received the request from Defense Secretary Robert Gates last Thursday before traveling to Europe, where he met with McChrystal. It was unclear how long Obama would take to act on the troop request.

“We’re going to go through this process of evaluating the goals and the strategy, and … at a point after that, we’ll get to discussing resources,” Gibbs said.

Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, said in Washington he expected Obama to settle on a strategy and troop levels later this month or in early November.

A US official said Obama held a roughly three-hour strategy review on Wednesday focusing on Pakistan, ways to improve cooperation with Islamabad and how to continue “disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda.” Another session on Friday will focus primarily on Afghanistan.

The decisions may be the most important, and difficult, of Obama’s young presidency, congressional leaders say.

BACKLASH OR CRITICISM?

US and NATO casualties have risen and public support for the eight-year-old war has eroded. Sending as many as 40,000 additional troops could spark a backlash within Obama’s own Democratic Party.

Sending a smaller number of troops, or no troops at all, will open Obama up to further criticism from congressional Republicans and, possibly, the military, for taking a more politically palatable middle-road approach.

CBS News, without citing named sources, reported that McChrystal wanted to ask for 50,000 troops but was convinced to lower the request to 40,000.

An alternative to the current counter-insurgency strategy, backed by Vice President Joe Biden, would focus more narrowly on air strikes against al Qaeda targets.

But Obama has told congressional leaders that he would neither substantially reduce the US mission in Afghanistan, nor shift the strategy to focus mainly on hunting militants.

Officials said strong consideration was being given to a war strategy that incorporates both counter-insurgency and counterterrorism operations inside Pakistan’s tribal areas.

Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell said McChrystal’s request, which will be kept secret, was based upon the assumption that the United States was pursuing a counter-insurgency strategy. This would focus more on securing the support of the Afghan people than killing militants.

“If the decisions that are made in the coming weeks are different from that, there can be adjustments made to the request,” Morrell said.

Gates has yet to provide the president with his personal recommendations, the Pentagon said.

A pivotal player in the decision making, Gates has said that many of his earlier reservations about adding forces have been addressed. He remains a strong proponent of a counter-insurgency strategy, which could signal that he may be leaning toward a further buildup.

Pressure has been mounting on Obama for weeks to make a swift decision. Republican Sen. John McCain, who was defeated by Obama in last year’s presidential election, repeated his call for Obama to implement the commander’s recommendations and not take “half-measures.”

Courtesy: Shanghai Daily

WASHINGTON: Defense Secretary Robert Gates appealed Monday for calm amid intense administration debate over the flagging war in Afghanistan, asking for time and privacy for the president to come to a decision – an apparent message to the commanding US general there who has pressed publicly for more American troops.

White House: US won't pull out of Afghanistan
US Marine radio operator and infantryman Lance Cpl. Walter Jennings of Normal, Ill. with Bravo Company, 1st Battalion 5th Marines walks in front of an armored vehicle, in Nawa district, Helmand province, southern Afghanistan, Monday, Oct. 5, 2009. [Agencies]
Gates’ careful remarks appeared to stand as an implicit rebuke of the man he helped install as the top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, for his lobbying as President Barack Obama faced a critical week of decision over whether to escalate the Afghan war.
In two separate appearances Monday, Gates made the point that Obama needs elbow room to make strategy decisions about the war – as the internal White House debate went increasingly public.”It is important that we take our time to do all we can to get this right,” Gates said at an Army conference. “In this process, it is imperative that all of us taking part in these deliberations – civilians and military alike – provide our best advice to the president candidly but privately.”

Later, speaking alongside Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Gates praised McChrystal and said no matter what Obama decides the general will execute it faithfully.

The fierce Taliban attack that killed eight American soldiers over the weekend added to the pressure. The assault overwhelmed a remote US outpost where American forces have been stretched thin in battling insurgents, underscoring the appeal from the top Afghanistan commander for as many as 40,000 additional forces – and at the same time reminding the nation of the costs of war.

Gates has not said whether he supports McChrystal’s recommendation to expand the number of US forces by as much as nearly 60 percent. He is holding that request in his desk drawer while Obama sorts through competing recommendations and theories from some of his most trusted advisers.

“I believe that the decisions that the president will make for the next stage of the Afghanistan campaign will be among the most important of his presidency,” Gates told the Army conference.

In trying to blunt the impression that the White House and military are at odds, Gates did not name names. But his remarks came days after McChrystal bluntly warned in London that Afghan insurgents are gathering strength. Any plan that falls short of stabilizing Afghanistan “is probably a shortsighted strategy,” the general said, and he called openly for additional resources.

That prompted Obama’s national security adviser, retired four-star Gen. James Jones, to say Sunday that military advice is best provided “up through the chain of command.”

The Government of Afghanistan declared a six-hour curfew in the capital Kabul Monday after one of the worst riots broke out across the city since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Afghan people look at a burning police vehicle in Kabul, Afghanistan, May 29. Afghan people look at a burning police vehicle in Kabul, Afghanistan, May 29, 2006. (Xinhua/AFP Photo) The riot was stirred by a road accident involving a U.S. military truck reportedly slamming into civilian vehicles. The fatal accident took place in Sarai Shamali, some 10 km north of the Presidential Palace, and killed at least 25 and damaged 15 civilian vehicles, according to eyewitnesses. The U.S. military has expressed its sorrow and accepted responsibility after the bloody road accident. However, the locals of Kabul gathered and started stoning the troops Monday. The riot soon snowballed with demonstrators torching buildings and scores of police posts as well as trying to force their way into compounds for the United Nations office and massing near the U.S. embassy. Meanwhile, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has expressed his deep sad over the traffic accident, by saying that the government of Afghanistan is the sole protector of the lives and property of Afghans, and called on his people to exercise restraint. At least eight people have been killed and more than 100 injured in riots. The toll and number of injured are expected to rise. Enditem (Agencies)

Courtesy : Xinhua

By: Pakistan Ka Khuda Hafiz

Still think India Not A Threat To Pakistan?

To beef up air attack capabilities in quickest possible time along the international border with Pakistan, the Indian Air Force has decided to station all its MIG-29 squardons at Adampur, the second largest Air Force base in the country.

The Adampur Air Force station, which is also known as home of MiG-29, already has two frontline fighter squardons and will see another squardon moving from Jamnagar in Gujrat soon. ” We consider ourselves to be a strategic air power establishment of the IAF in the western sector, ever ready for operations. We are fully geared up to operate in any given time frame like any other Air Force stations of the country,” said Air Commodore HS Arora, Air Officer Commanding of the Adampur air base.

To extend  that the service life of MiG 29 by 25 to 40 years, the RAC MiG aircraft coporation signed a contract with the ministry of defence to upgrade over 60 fighters in service with the IAF since 1980s.

The Adampur Air Force station, which is also known as home of MiG 29s, already has two frontline fighter squadrons and will see another squadron moving from Jamnagar in Gujarat soon.

‘We consider ourselves to be a strategic air power establishment of the IAF in the western sector, ever ready for operations. We are fully geared up to operate in any given time frame like any other Air Force stations of the country,’ said Air Commodore HS Arora, Air Officer Commanding of the Adampur air base.

To extend the service life of MiG 29 by 25 to 40 years, the RAC MiG aircraft corporation signed a contract with the Ministry of Defence to upgrade over 60 fighters in service with the IAF since the 1980s.

‘We are looking forward to induct upgraded Mig 29s which will happen sometime next year. The Ministry of Defence and Air headquarters is monitoring it,’ Air Commodore Arora said.

He said six MiG-29 fighters are being upgraded and flight-tested in Russia and the remaining aircraft will be overhauled in India with the aid of Russian experts, and added that IAF pilots and technicians are already undergoing training there.

‘The upgraded MiG 29 fighters will have better radar systems and avionics to help fighters, a new weapon control system, modernised RD-33 engines, which would increase the aircraft hitting capability from long ranges will also be extremely helpful on any future attack on Pakistan,’ Air Commodore Arora added.

The first batch of upgraded fighters will arrive in the second half of 2010 and Russia will complete the upgradation of 60 MiG-29 fighters by 2013.

The Indian Air Force, which turns 77 this year, in order to become a strategic force in the world, has been going under modernisation in a big way.

The IAF this year inducted one Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, and two more will come on line in 2010 to strengthen the Air Force’s capability to see beyond enemy lines.

In addition, the IAF is acquiring three midair refuelers, six C-130 transport aircraft, 80 medium-lift helicopters, Spyder air defense systems, medium power radars and low-level transportable radar.

The IAF is also upgrading six airstrips in Arunachal Pradesh to rapidly deploy troops and jointly developing with Russia fifth generation fighter aircrafts.

Afghanistan’s political and social turmoil has been aggravated by different intentions of the participating nations that constitute the coalition forces. In the short term, the fragile Afghan regime is finding it difficult to tame its restive domestic situation. Still, a prescription could help bring the country out of the mess if key players adopt a peaceful and reconciliatory approach in their push for the end of the war.The United States should first put an end to the war. The anti-terror war, which the former US administration of George W Bush launched in 2001, has turned out to be the source of ceaseless turbulence and violence in the past years. To promote much-needed reconciliation among the parties concerned, the US should end its military action. The war has neither brought the Islamic nation peace and security as the Bush administration originally promised, nor brought any tangible benefits to the US itself. On the contrary, the legitimacy of the US military action has been under increasing doubt.

Public opinion within the US on the war has undergone dramatic change. According to a recent poll, opinion in favor of the war has declined from 53 percent in April to 39 percent, while opinion opposed to the war has increased to 58 percent from 46 percent. The US Congress has also cast doubt over the Obama administration’s Afghanistan strategy. The opposition from 74 percent Democrats and 70 percent independent votes to the war would be a big restraint on the Obama administration’s larger military strides given that the new president cannot afford to bet his political fate on a unpopular war. Since taking office as president, Obama has been under pressure from the Pentagon for military reinforcements in Afghanistan. The calls of war opponents over that of supporters will give the young US president the best chance to extricate himself from the Pentagon’s pressures. If Obama resolutely decides to stop the war, that would not only meet the US public expectations and save more American lives, but also help recover the US’ peaceful image and enhance the president’s personal political prospects.

Another way to help Afghanistan break the current deadlock is to promote reconciliation among the Afghan government, the Taliban and the country’s major warlords, all being key actors that can play an influential role in deciding the country’s prospect. In addition to the US factor, the chaos in Afghanistan is also closely related to the long-standing domestic strife between factions. Afghanistan experienced numerous wars and conflicts in history, including invasion by the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the US war. The war-ravaged Asian nation is undergoing a chaotic battle that has involved the US-led coalition forces, its government troops and domestic warlords, the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The disorderly confrontations and strife do no good to anyone but have only caused untold suffering to Afghan people.

Afghanistan’s political disorder is also the main cause of its domestic chaos. The country’s presidential election on Aug 20 has so far failed to produce a final result. The recount of votes in more than 600 polling stations alleged to have suffered fraud is expected to last another two or three months, which will add to the chaos. The US has urged Afghan president Hamid Karzai to hold a second round of voting. It seems that Karzai has hammered home the perception that the US is not a reliable partner that can help end Afghanistan’s current predicament. Talks, he thinks, is the only way out. The Afghan president is likely to open the process of tri-party peace talks with the Taliban and major warlords provided that the US ends its military action.

Support from the international community is needed to help Afghanistan make a substantive move toward peace. The international community can take advantage of the ever-mounting anti-war calls within the US to prompt the Obama administration to end the war and withdraw US troops. Germany, France and Britain have planned an international conference this year to discuss the gradual withdrawal of Afghanistan military deployment. International pressures may offer Obama another excuse to withdraw US troops. The UN Security Council should carry the baton from the three European nations to convene a conference on the Afghanistan issue and try to reach a consensus among its five permanent Security Council members and draft a roadmap and timetable for resolution of the thorny issue. In the process, a ticklish issue is whether parties concerned can accept the Taliban as a key player in Afghanistan and how to dispose of the Al Qaeda armed forces, an issue that has a key bearing on the outcome of any international conference on the Afghanistan issue.

Surely, an international peacekeeping mission is needed in the absence of US troops. With the aid of international peacekeepers, the Afghanistan government and its security forces can be expected to exercise effective control over domestic unrest and maintain peace and security.

The author is deputy secretary-general of the China Council for National Security Policy Studies